[gridengine dev] [DRAFT PATCH] Enhancement: exempt certain programs from execd control
w.hay at ucl.ac.uk
Fri Nov 11 12:25:22 UTC 2011
On 11 November 2011 10:29, Mark Dixon <m.c.dixon at leeds.ac.uk> wrote:
> On Fri, 11 Nov 2011, William Hay wrote:
>> While I'm normally in favour of fully general facilities I wonder if
>> this is a little too general. If the purpose of the patch is to
>> exclude SGE infrastructure from being counted as part of the job then
>> could the same effect not be achieved by having qrsh drop the group
>> assigned to the job by the execd. Obvious downsides to my approach:
>> i)I'm only guessing it will work as I've neither read the relevant
>> code nor tested it.
>> ii)As an obvious cause/consequence of the above my idea is pure vaporware.
>> iii)Requires that qrsh start with some privileges, check the sgeconfig
>> to get the gid_range, drop groups and then drop privileges. Errors in
>> said code could represent a security problem.
> Hi William, thanks for the interest :)
> It may well be too general a feature. I admit I cannot think of another
> good example of where it would come in useful (perhaps for starting an
> ancillary process which uses lots of h_vmem e.g. due to mmap, but very
> little real memory?). Even if this doesn't go anywhere, it has been a
> useful exercise in becoming familiar with the GE code base!
> Also, dropping the appropriate group with a setgroups call does work -
> I've got a proof of concept SUID wrapper to qrsh that does this.
The reason I said privileges was that I was thinking of the
(draft)posix capabilities which has the nice CAP_SETGID functionality
on Linux that gives a far lower level of privilege. Recent linux
versions can associate capabilities with files so on Linux you could
grant a far lower level of privilege to qrsh to enable it to drop a
> However, I really don't like the idea of using SUID root binaries where
> they're not necessary: they're a pain to make sure they do the right
> thing, a pain to install correctly, and they make people suspicious.
> I may well be wrong, but SUID root here looks like overkill to me.
>> If you don't trust your users then pointing SGE_ROOT and SGE_CELL at a
>> private SGE config could allow arbitrary programs to escape SGE's
> Are you talking about the SUID solution here, or the suggested
> "exempt" feature?
I was talking about my own idea.
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